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Abstract
This paper studies a leader-follower partially observable stochastic game where
(i) the two agents are non-cooperative, and (ii) the follower’s objective is unknown to
the leader and/or the follower is irrational. We determine the leader’s optimal value
function assuming a worst-case scenario. Motivated by the structural properties
of this value function and its computational complexity, we design a viable and
computationally efficient solution procedure for computing a lower bound of the
value function and an associated policy for the finite horizon case. We analyze
the error bounds and show that the algorithm for computing the value function
converges for the infinite horizon case. We illustrate the potential application of the
proposed approach in a security context for a liquid egg production example.
Keywords: worst-case analysis; partially observable Markov decision process; partially
observable stochastic game.
1 Introduction
Non-collaborative leader-follower games have been applied to security problems, e.g., the
placement of checkpoints and canine units at Los Angeles International Airport (Jain
et al. 2010). Game-theoretic approaches commonly assume that (i) the objective of the
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follower is well-understood, and (ii) the follower is rational and intends to optimize its
expected criterion. However, it has been documented that these assumptions are often
not realistic (Camerer 2011). Fully understanding the objectives of an adversary (com-
monly modeled as the follower) in security domains is a formidable, if not impossible,
task as the intent of the adversary can span a wide range of possibly unknown issues
(Bier et al. 2007). Meanwhile, perfect rationality is often an unlikely human behavior
(March 1978); the selection of actions may also depend on task complexity, the interplay
between emotion and cognition, etc. (Conlisk 1996).
In this paper, we address these issues by considering the case where: (i) the objective
of the follower is unknown to the leader; and/or (ii) the follower is possibly irrational.
The intent of this research is to determine the best performance for the leader under the
worst-case scenario regarding the behavior of the follower, assuming also that at each
decision epoch the state of each agent cannot be precisely observed by the other agent.
We assume that both agents adapt to the actions of the other agent. Repeated Stackel-
berg games, repeated Bayesian games, and multi-period stochastic games were developed
in order to capture the dynamic interaction between a leader and its adversary. Li et al.
(2018) analyzed and computed the agents’ security strategies for a two-player zero-sum
repeated Bayesian game. Examples of how to employ repeated Stackelberg games to
model the interaction between a defender (the leader) and its adversary (the follower)
can be found in the context of wildlife security (Yang et al. 2014) and fisheries security
(Haskell et al. 2014). The stochastic game is a generalization of repeated games, where
the state of the system evolves on the basis of the current state and the actions taken
by all agents. Bakir and Kardes (2009) have employed a stochastic game model to eval-
uate the effectiveness of alternative interdiction strategies for cargo container security.
Kardes et al. (2011) further introduced robust optimization to stochastic games for the
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case where reward structure and/or transition probabilities of the game are uncertain.
A key assumption of these stochastic games and their applications is that the state of the
adversary is precisely known to each agent. This assumption, however, is unrealistic in
many situations. Partially observable stochastic games are a new, relatively unexamined
generalization of stochastic games that takes into consideration that the states of the
game are not precisely observable to the agents and each agent selects its action based
on these (possibly noisy) observations. A leader-follower partially observable stochastic
game was used to assess adversarial risk for a liquid egg production facility in Chang et
al. (2015, 2017) under the assumptions that (i) the reward structure of the adversary
is known and (ii) the adversary is perfectly rational. The research in this paper further
considers the case where these assumptions are invalid. Thus, we consider a situation
where the leader must make decisions based on only partial observations of the adver-
sary, coping with not knowing the adversary’s objectives and/or behavior.
We remark that researchers have employed robust optimization in single-agent partially
observable Markov decision processes (POMDPs) to address the ambiguity of model pa-
rameters. Itoh and Nakamura (2007) described the possible values for each parameter
by an interval and specified a set of possible distributions for each unknown probability
distribution. Osogami (2015) proved that the robust value function is still convex when
the uncertainty set is convex. It is important to point out that a zero-sum partially
observable stochastic game can be transformed to a robust POMDP under the assump-
tion of S-rectangularity (Rasouli and Saghafian 2018). The general modeling framework
presented in this paper, however, considers general-sum non-collaborative games and
does not require such assumptions.
Contributions of this paper are summarized as follows.
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(i) We study a leader-follower partially observable stochastic game under a worst-case
scenario where the leader does not know the follower’s objectives and/or the fol-
lower is irrational. Our intent is to determine a best policy for the leader under
these circumstances. Worst-case analysis has been a prevalent approach for estab-
lishing performance benchmarks in one-shot security planning (Simchi-Levi and
Wei 2015, Caprara et al. 2016). These benchmarks have been further used to re-
veal the value of understanding the behavior of adversaries in single-period security
applications (Nguyen et al. 2013). However, to our best knowledge, the counter-
part analysis has not been explored for multi-agent partially observable stochastic
systems in the existing literature. We fill this gap by extending the worst-case
analysis to a partially observable stochastic game and identifying the baseline per-
formance for the leader. Thus, this research is a first step for further evaluating
the value of improved understanding of the adversary’s behavior in multi-agent
partially observable stochastic systems.
(ii) We investigate the structural properties of the leader’s optimal value function. A
key property of a POMDP is its value function is piecewise linear and convex. In
contrast, the leader’s optimal value function in this paper is only piecewise linear
for the finite horizon case and can be an arbitrary function for the case where the
total reward is discounted over an infinite horizon.
(iii) The modest structural results for the leader’s optimal value function impose com-
putational challenges. To establish a benchmark for the leader’s performance, we
present a backward recursive algorithm to efficiently construct a lower bound for
the leader’s value function for the finite horizon case. Specifically, the algorithm at
each iteration approximates the optimal value function by a piecewise linear and
concave function. Existing POMDP algorithms can then be employed to evaluate
the worst-case performance for each leader’s action. This algorithm further makes
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use of a geometric approach and mixed integer programs (MIPs) to determine the
leader’s value function. We evaluate the quality of the lower bound and show that
the approximation function is no worse than the value function associated with the
second best action of the leader and the approximation error could be zero under
certain circumstances. We also show that this algorithm converges for the infinite
horizon.
(iv) We illustrate these results using a liquid egg production problem, where the opera-
tions manager is attempting to protect the production facility against an adversary
who intends to insert a biological toxin into the food production system. We test
and validate our solution approach using simulation.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we define the leader-follower partially
observable stochastic game, where the objective of the leader is to maximize the ex-
pected total discounted reward under the worst-case scenario of the follower. Section
3 presents the structural results of the leader’s optimal value function. We discuss the
computational implications of these results for determining the value function exactly.
In Section 4, we propose and outline a three-step solution procedure for constructing
a lower bound for this value function, consisting of PURGE-step, DOMINANCE-step,
and the APPROXIMATION-step. We discuss each of these steps in detail in Section
5-7. Specifically, Section 5 utilizes an existing POMDP algorithm to eliminate redun-
dant vectors when constructing the worst-case value function for a given leader’s action;
Section 6 combines a geometric approach and a MIP to determine the optimal value
function; and Section 7 approximates the resulting value function by a piecewise linear
and concave function. The approximation function is used in the next iteration of the
recursive algorithm. The error bound and the convergence result for the infinite horizon
case are presented in Section 8. Section 9 illustrates the potential application of this
approach to a liquid egg production problem. Finally, Section 10 summarizes research
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results and discusses future research directions.
2 Problem Statement
The partially observable stochastic game involves two agents: a leader and a follower.
The decision epochs are t = 0, 1, 2, ..., T where T <∞ or T =∞. Let {skt , t = 0, 1, 2, ...},
{akt , t = 0, 1, ...} and {zkt , t = 1, 2, ...} be the state, action, and observation processes for
agent k ∈ {L = leader, F = follower}. The state space Sk, the action space Ak, and the
observation space Zk are each assumed to be finite. We assume agent k knows its own
state skt , while the agent k can only partially observe the other agent’s state through
observation zkt . Denote st = {sLt , sFt }, zt = {zLt , zFt }, and at = {aLt , aFt }.
At each decision epoch, the leader chooses its action aLt by assuming that the follower’s
worst response action to aLt is a
F
t . Let ζt = {sLt , ..., sL0 , zLt , ..., zL1 , at−1, ..., a0, x0} be the
leader’s information history at time t, where x0 = {P (sF0 )} is a priori probability mass
vector over SF . Assume x0 is given. Thus, ζt = {sLt , zLt , at−1, ζt−1}. The conditional
probability for the leader pij(z
L, a) = P [zLt+1 = z
L, st+1 = j|st = i, at = a] is assumed
given. Let P (zL, a) be the sub-stochastic matrix {pij(zL, a)}.
Let r(st, at) be the scalar reward received by the leader at epoch t < T , given the state
st and action at. The reward structure of the follower r
F (st, at), however, is unknown.
The criterion we consider v0(ζ0) is the expected total discounted reward over horizon
T . Namely, v0(ζ0) = E{
∑T
t=0 β
tr(st, at)|ζ0} for the finite horizon case and v0(ζ0) =
E{∑∞t=0 βtr(st, at)|ζ0} for the infinite horizon case, where E{.|ζ0} is the expectation op-
erator conditioned on ζ0, and β ≥ 0 is the discount factor. We assume β < 1 for the infi-
nite horizon case in order to ensure that E{∑∞t=0 βtr(st, at)|ζ0} is well defined. The ob-
jective of the worst-case analysis is to determine a policy pair (piL,∗, piF,∗) : {ζt} → AL×
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AF such that vpi
L,∗,piF,∗
0 (ζ0) = maxaLt ∈AL,t=1,...,T minaFt ∈AF ,t=1,...,T E{
∑T
t=0 β
tr(st, at)|ζ0}.
We remark this model is different from a zero-sum partially observable stochastic game.
To see this, let a˜Ft be the action actually selected by the follower in the zero-sum game,
and ζ˜t = {sFt , ..., sF0 , zFt , ..., zF1 , a˜Ft−1, ..., a˜F0 , xF0 } be the follower’s information history,
where xF0 = {P (sL0 )} is a priori probability mass vector over SL. The actual action
a˜Ft may be different from the worst response action a
F
t for the following two reasons,
even if rF (st, at) = −r(st, at): (i) the follower may not be perfectly rational; and (ii)
the rational follower selects its true action a˜F on the basis of {ζ˜t} in the zero-sum
game, whereas the leader determines aFt on the basis of the leader’s information history
{ζt}. In the worst-case analysis, the private information history {ζ˜t} of the follower is
unknown to the leader, and (piL,∗, piF,∗) directly selects both aLt and the worst response
action aFt at epoch t on the basis of information pattern {ζt}. Thus, for any piF ∈ ΠF ,
vpi
L,∗,piF,∗
0 (ζ0) ≤ vpi
L,∗,piF
0 (ζ0), where Π
F is the policy space of the follower.
3 Structural Results
Let vt(ζt) be the maximal value of the worst-case expected total discounted reward to
be accrued from epoch t until T , given information history ζt. We intend to develop a
recursive procedure for determining the optimal value function vt from vt+1.
Let xt = {xt(sFt ), sFt ∈ SF }, where xt(sFt ) = P (sFt |ζt). Thus, xt is a “belief” array
indicating the leader’s inference about the follower’s state sFt . Define
(i) σ(zLt+1, s
L
t+1, at, xt) = P (z
L
t+1, s
L
t+1, at|ζt) =
∑
sFt+1
∑
sFt
P (zLt+1, st+1|st, at)xt(sFt ),
(ii) λ(zLt+1, s
L
t+1, at, xt) is the stochastic array with scalar element
P (sFt+1|ζt+1) =
∑
sFt
P (zLt+1, st+1|st, at)xt(sFt )
σ(zLt+1, s
L
t+1, at, xt)
,
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where we assume σ(zLt+1, s
L
t+1, at, xt) 6= 0.
Let V be the set of all bounded, real-valued functions on SL×X having supremum norm
||v|| = sup{|v(sL, x)| : sL ∈ SL, x ∈ X}. Then (V, ||.||) is a Banach space. Define the
operators Ha
L
: V → V and H : V → V as
[Ha
L
v](sL, x) = min
aF∈AF
{
xr(sL, a) + β
∑
zL′
∑
sL′
σ(zL
′
, sL
′
, a, x)v(sL
′
, λ(zL
′
, sL
′
, a, x))
}
,
Hv = max
aL∈AL
[Ha
L
v],
where xr(sL, a) =
∑
sF x(s
F )r(s, a).
Proposition 1.
va
L
t (ζt) = v
aL
t (s
L
t , xt) = [H
aLvt+1](s
L
t , xt),
vt(ζt) = vt(s
L
t , xt) = [Hvt+1](s
L
t , xt).
Thus, va
L
t and vt are dependent on ζt only through (s
L
t , xt), and (s
L
t , xt) is a sufficient
statistic for va
L
t and vt.
Proof. The proof follows the same lines of arguments in Smallwood and Sondik (1973)
and the fact that both σ(zLt+1, s
L
t+1, at, xt) and λ(z
L
t+1, s
L
t+1, at, xt) are functions of (s
L
t , xt).
Proposition 2. ∀0 ≤ β < 1, the operators HaL and H are contraction mappings on V
having modulus β.
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of Proposition 6.2.4 in Puterman (1994).
As a result, there is a unique fixed point v∗ ∈ V such that the sequence {vn}, where
vn = Hvn−1, converges to v∗ for any given v0 for the infinite planning horizon.
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A main result of a finite horizon POMDP is that its value function is piecewise linear
and convex. We show, however, that it is not the case for the optimal value function
vt. To see it, we say a real-valued function f(s
L, x) for a fixed sL is piecewise linear
on X if there exists a set Γ(sL), |Γ(sL)| < ∞ such that ∀x ∈ X, f(sL, x) = xγ and
γ ∈ Γ(sL), where xγ = ∑sF x(sF )γ(sF ), and |Γ(sL)| is the cardinality of the set Γ(sL);
a real-valued function f(sL, x) is piecewise linear and concave (convex) on X for a fixed
sL if and only if there exists a finite set Γ(sL) such that f(sL, x) = min{xγ : γ ∈ Γ(sL)}
(f(sL, x) = max{xγ : γ ∈ Γ(sL)}). For simplicity, below when we say a function f(sL, x)
is piecewise linear and concave (convex), we implicitly mean f(sL, x) is piecewise linear
and concave (convex) in x, for any given sL ∈ SL.
Proposition 3. Assume v is piecewise linear. Then, ∀aL ∈ AL, HaLv and Hv are also
piecewise linear.
Proof. Assume v is piecewise linear. Equivalently, there exists a finite set Γ(sL) such
that
v(sL
′
, λ(zL
′
, sL
′
, a, x)) = λ(zL
′
, sL
′
, a, x)γl(z
L′ ,sL
′
,a,x), γ ∈ Γ(sL′),
where the function l(zL
′
, sL
′
, a, x) defines the index of the γ vector corresponding to
λ(zL
′
, sL
′
, a, x). We say γ
′a ∈ Γ′(sL, a), if γ′a is of the form
γ
′a(sF ) = rL(s, a) + β
∑
s′
∑
zL′
P (s′, zL
′ |s, a)γ(sF ′)l(zL
′
,sL
′
,a,x),
where γ ∈ Γ(sL′). Note,
[Hv](sL, x) = max
aL
min
aF
{
xγ
′a : γ
′a ∈ Γ′(sL)
}
,
where Γ′(sL) = ∪a∈AΓ′(sL, a). Hence, Hv is piecewise linear. The proof for HaLv is
9
straightforward.
However, Figure 1 illustrates that Hv may not be convex or concave, even if v is piece-
wise linear and concave (convex). Even worse, if v is not concave, then Ha
L
v is not
concave either, ∀aL ∈ AL. In the limit, operator H also does not preserve linearity.
(a) Ha
L
v (b) Hv
Figure 1: Hv and Ha
L
v are piecewise linear but not necessarily concave or convex
This structural difference from traditional POMDPs imposes an additional algorithmic
challenge for determining vt from vt+1. Convexity is the basis for existing POMDP
algorithms (Sondik 1971, Cheng 1988, Pineau et al. 2003, Shani et al. 2013). These ap-
proaches are, however, not applicable in our case as vt is not concave (nor convex). Since
we aim to analyze the baseline performance of the leader, we construct a computation-
ally efficient lower bound for vt in this paper as an initial effort. Whether the existing
POMDP algorithms could be extended to solve the proposed problem is an interesting
topic for future research.
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4 Lower Bound Solution Approach
We now motivate the development of the lower bound solution approach. Recall that
for an arbitrary given piecewise linear function v ∈ V , neither Hv nor HaLv is concave.
Assume v˜ is a piecewise linear and concave approximation of v satisfying v˜ ≤ v (i.e.,
v˜(sL, x) ≤ v(sL, x), ∀sL ∈ SL, x ∈ X). Namely, there is a finite set Γ˜(sL) such that
v˜(sL, x) = min{xγ : γ ∈ Γ˜(sL)}. Pick any aL ∈ AL,
[Ha
L
v˜](sL, x)
= min
aF∈AF
{
xr(sL, a) + β
∑
zL′
∑
sL′
σ(zL
′
, sL
′
, a, x)×min[λ(zL′ , sL′ , a, x)γ′ : γ′ ∈ Γ˜(sL′)]
}
= min
aF∈AF
{
xr(sL, a) + β
∑
zL′
∑
sL′
min[
∑
sF ′
∑
sF
P (zL
′
, s′|s, a)x(sF )γ′(sF ′) : γ′ ∈ Γ˜(sL′)]
}
= min
{
xγ : γ ∈ G(sL, aL)
}
,
where γ ∈ G(sL, aL) if γ = r(s, a) + β∑zL′∑s′ P (zL′ , s′|s, a)γ′(sF ′). Thus, HaL v˜ is
piecewise linear and concave. Theorem 1 below further shows that there is a finite set
Γ(sL) such that Hv˜ = maxk1 mink2{xγk1,k2 : γ ∈ Γ(sL)}.
Theorem 1. There is a finite set of arrays Γ(sL) = {γk1,k2}k1,k2≥0 that only depends
on sL, such that:
[Hv˜](sL, x) = max
k1
min
k2
{xγk1,k2 : γk1,k2 ∈ Γ(sL)}.
Proof. The proof follows the similar line as in Proposition 3, and the fact that Ha
L
v˜ is
piecewise linear and concave.
We remark that each element of Γ(sL) is associated with a pair of action (aL, aF ). De-
note Γ(sL, k1) = {γk′1,k′2 : γk′1,k′2 ∈ Γ(sL), k′1 = k1}. Each set Γ(sL, k1) corresponds to a
leader’s action aL, and each vector γ ∈ Γ(sL, k1) is associated with a follower’s worst-case
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action aF . The best worst-case policy for Hv˜ can thus be determined by the following
steps: (a) determine (sL, x); (b) for each k1, find γ
k1,∗ in arg min{xγ : γ ∈ Γ(sL, k1)},
and let Θ(sL) = ∪k1{γk1,∗}; (c) determine γ∗,∗ in arg max{xγ : γ ∈ Θ(sL)}; (d) select
the action pair associated with γ∗,∗.
By constructing a piecewise linear and concave function v˜ ∈ V satisfying v˜ ≤ v, we thus
transform a part of the problem to a POMDP with an enlarged state space SL×X. As
a result, many of existing POMDP algorithms can be extended to efficiently determine
Ha
L
v˜, further paving a computationally possible and attractive way for determining Hv˜.
Moreover, it is straightforward to show that Hv˜ ≤ Hv, that is, Hv˜ is also a lower bound
of Hv.
We now present an algorithm to implement this idea. Specifically, assume the set
Γ˜t+1(s
L) is given for all sL ∈ SL where v˜t+1(sL, x) = min{xγ : γ ∈ Γ˜t+1(sL)} and
v˜t+1 ≤ vt+1. We are interested in developing an algorithm to determine: (i) the set
Γt(s
L), where v¯t(s
L, x) = [Hv˜t+1](s
L, x) = maxk1 mink2{xγk1,k2 : γk1,k2 ∈ Γt(sL)}; and
(ii) its approximation set Γ˜t(s
L), where v˜t(s
L, x) = min{xγ : γ ∈ Γ˜t(sL)} satisfies v˜t ≤ v¯t.
Note that the contraction operator H and the development of the algorithm guarantee
that if v˜t+1 ≤ vt+1, then v˜t ≤ v¯t ≤ vt. A three-step procedure is presented in Figure 2.
Given v˜t+1, we have shown that ∀aL ∈ AL, v¯aLt (sL, x) = min{xγ : γ ∈ G(sL, aL)}. The
setG(sL, aL) may contain many redundant γ-vectors which are never used in determining
v¯a
L
t . The PURGE-step is to remove all redundant γ-vectors in each G(s
L, aL), and it can
be accomplished by the PURGE operation in the existing POMDP literature. Similarly,
while we could simply set Γt(s
L) = G(sL) where G(sL) = ∪aL∈ALG(sL, aL), for compu-
tational advantage, we set Γt(s
L) to be the subset of G(sL) that has the smallest cardi-
nality and satisfies maxk1 mink2{xγk1,k2 : γ ∈ Γt(sL)} = maxaL mink2{xγa
L,k2 : γa
L,k2 ∈
G(sL)}. The DOMINANCE operation is to eliminate all redundant sets G(sL, aL) from
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PURGE-step. Determine v¯a
L
t (s
L, x) = [Ha
L
v˜t+1](s
L, x) = min{xγ : γ ∈
G(sL, aL)}, for each leader’s action aL. Existing POMDP techniques can
be employed to efficiently eliminate redundant γ-vectors in G(sL, aL) by
the PURGE operation.
DOMINANCE-step. Determine v¯t(s
L, x) = [Hv˜t+1](s
L, x) = maxk1 mink2{xγk1,k2 :
γk1,k2 ∈ Γt(sL)}. While Γt(sL) can simply be ∪aL∈ALG(sL, aL), we seek to
remove redundant sets G(sL, aL) in Γt(s
L) quickly by the DOMINANCE
operation.
APPROXIMATION-step. Determine Γ˜t(s
L) where v˜t(s
L, x) = min{xγ : γ ∈ Γ˜t(sL)}
is the best piecewise linear concave approximation of v¯t satisfying v˜t ≤ v¯t.
Figure 2: The three steps for the lower bound solution approach
Γt(s
L). Note that the resulting v¯t = Hv˜t+1 from the DOMINANCE-step is again not
concave. In order to proceed to the next iteration, the APPROXIMATION-step approx-
imates v¯t by a piecewise linear and concave function v˜t satisfying v˜t ≤ v¯t.
Performing all required operations and approximation, we have developed a backward
recursive algorithm for determining a lower bound of the leader’s best worst-case perfor-
mance in a finite-horizon partially observable stochastic game. The pseudocode of the
entire procedure is summarized in Algorithm 1. The rest of the paper presents each step
in more detail.
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Algorithm 1 Entire Algorithm for a Finite Horizon Partially Observable Stochastic
Game
Set ΓT (s
L) = ∅, Γ˜T (sL) = ∅, ∀sL ∈ SL, and t = T − 1.
while (t ≥ 0) do
for each sL ∈ SL do
PURGE-step:
for each aL ∈ AL do
Set G(sL, aL) = ∪aF∈AF
{
r(s, a) + β
∑
s′
∑
zL P (s
′, zL|s, a)γ(sF ′) :
γ ∈ Γ˜t+1(sL′)
}
.
G(sL, aL)=PURGE(G(sL, aL)) to remove redundant γ-vectors.
end for
DOMINANCE-step:
Set G(sL) = ∪aL∈ALG(sL, aL).
Select the superset Γct(s
L) out of G(sL) (Algorithm 3):
Perform the pairwise dominance procedure on G(sL) to
define the superset Γct(s
L). The set Γct(s
L) is a set of
G(sL, aL)s such that ∀G(sL, aL) ∈ Γct(sL), there is no set
G(sL, aL
′
), aL
′ 6= aL, dominating G(sL, aL).
Select the set Γt(s
L) out of Γct(s
L) (Algorithm 4):
Perform the jointly dominance procedure on Γct(s
L) to
further remove the subsets in Γct(s
L) that are strictly
dominated by the set Γct(s
L). Thus, v¯t(s
L, x) =
maxk1 mink2{xγk1,k2 : γk1,k2 ∈ Γt(sL)}.
APPROXIMATION-step:
Determine Γ˜t(s
L) where
v˜t(s
L, x) = min{xγ : γ ∈ Γ˜t(sL)} is the best piecewise linear
concave approximation of v¯t(s
L, x) and v˜t ≤ v¯t, and evaluate
the approximation error t(s
L) (Algorithm 5).
end for
Set t = t− 1.
end while
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5 PURGE Operation
Given the set Γ˜t+1(s
L), we have shown that v¯a
L
t (s
L, x) = [Ha
L
v˜t+1](s
L, x) = min{xγ :
γ ∈ G(sL, aL)} where we could set
G(sL, aL) = ∪aF∈AF
{
r(s, a) + β
∑
zL′
∑
s′
P (zL
′
, s′|s, a)γ′(sF ′) : γ′ ∈ Γ˜t+1(sL′)
}
.
A large number of γ-vectors could be generated in this step, however, only a small
number of these vectors define the value function v¯a
L
t . A γ ∈ G(sL, aL) is commonly
called redundant if and only if for all x ∈ X, there is a γ′ ∈ G(sL, aL), γ′ 6= γ such that
xγ′ ≤ xγ; a γ ∈ G(sL, aL) is referred as a defining vector for v¯aLt if there exists a belief
point x∗ ∈ X such that v¯aLt (sL, x) = x∗γ and these belief points are often called witness
points. The objective of PURGE operation is to remove as many redundant vectors from
G(sL, aL) as possible in order to define v¯a
L
t efficiently.
The PURGE step is a well-known step in the classical POMDP literature and many
research efforts have been made to design fast and computationally efficient PURGE
operators (Cassandra et al. 1997, Lin et al. 2004). While developing new POMDP
algorithms is outside the scope of the paper, we transform a part of our problem into
a special form of POMDPs that can be solved by existing POMDP algorithms. This
transformation enables the determination of a lower bound for the optimal value function
vt. We adopt the PURGE operator developed by Lin et al. (2004) in our illustrative
example.
6 DOMINANCE Operation
We now determine Γt(s
L) ⊆ G(sL) = ∪aL∈ALG(sL, aL), ∀sL ∈ SL by extending the
notion of redundancy of a γ-vector to a set. For a given sL ∈ SL, a set G(sL, aL) is
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dominated by Γt(s
L) on X if and only if ∀x ∈ X, there is always a set G(sL, aL′) in
Γt(s
L) such that v¯a
L
t (s
L, x) ≤ v¯aL′t (sL, x) where v¯a
L
t = min{xγ : γ ∈ G(sL, aL)}; a set
G(sL, aL) is referred as supporting if there is at least one belief point x′ ∈ X such that
v¯t(s
L, x′) = min{x′γ : γ ∈ G(sL, aL)}. For example, both sets G(sL, aL1 ) and G(sL, aL4 )
in Figure 3 are dominated sets, while sets G(sL, aL2 ) and G(s
L, aL3 ) are supporting for
v¯t. We seek to remove all dominated sets in order to define Γt efficiently.
Figure 3: dominated and supporting sets
Let the DOMINANCE operator be that Γ(sL) = DOMINANCE(G(sL)) only contains
supporting sets of v¯t. We now present a two-step procedure for the DOMINANCE op-
erator. To this end, we further say a set G(sL, aL) is pair-wise dominated by a set
G(sL, aL
′
) if and only if ∀x ∈ X, v¯aL(sL, x) ≤ v¯aL′ (sL, x). For example, set G(sL, aL4 ) is
pair-wise dominated by the set G(sL, aL1 ) in Figure 3.
The first step is to build a superset Γct(s
L) ⊂ G(sL), where for any G(sL, aL) in Γct(sL),
there is no G(sL, aL
′
) in Γct(s
L) pair-wise dominating G(sL, aL). We show the pairwise
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dominance relationship between two sets in G(sL) can be determined efficiently by a
sequence of linear programs (LPs), employing a dual relationship between hyperplanes
and points. Clearly, a set G(sL, aL) in Γct(s
L) could still be a dominated set, such as
G(sL, aL1 ) in Figure 3. The second step employs a mixed integer program (MIP) to
further remove all dominated sets in Γct(s
L) to define Γ(sL). Strictly speaking, only the
second step is necessary, the main purpose of the first step is to substantially decrease
the number and the size of MIPs encountered in the second step.
6.1 Determine the Superset Γct(s
L) ⊇ Γt(sL)
In computational geometry, the dual of a hyperplane p(u) =
∑n−1
i=1 piui+pn in the primal
Rn space is the point p∗ = (p1, ...pn) ∈ Rn, and the dual of a point p = (p1, ...pn) ∈ Rn
is a hyperplane p∗(u) =
∑n−1
i=1 piui + pn. The lower envelope of a given set of hy-
perplanes {pk(u) = ∑n−1i=1 pki ui + pkn}k∈K is the piecewise linear and concave function
p(u) = mink∈K{
∑n−1
i=1 p
k
i ui + p
k
n}, whereas the upper envelope of the given set of hy-
perplanes is the piecewise linear and convex function p¯(u) = maxk∈K{
∑n−1
i=1 p
k
i ui + p
k
n}.
Each of the hyperplanes on the upper envelope in the primal space corresponds to a
vertice of the upper convex hull (with respect to the pn-axis) in the dual space (de Berg
et al. 2008, Zhang 2010).
The dual relationship between hyperplanes and points was first introduced to POMDPs
in Zhang (2010) in order to provide geometric insights on existing POMDP algorithms.
In this subsection, we employ the dual perspective to define a superset Γct(s
L) ⊇ Γt(sL)
by efficiently removing all pair-wise dominated sets G(sL, aL) from G(sL). We start with
the following definitions. Similar definitions and explanations in the context of POMDPs
can be found in Zhang (2010).
Given a set Ω ∈ R|SF | of points, the convex hull is the set Co(Ω) ≡ {∑j=1 λjwj :
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∑
j=1 λj = 1 and wj ∈ Ω, λj ≥ 0,∀j}. The surface of the convex hull with negative
outernormal directions, the negative convex hull (NCo), is the set NCo(Ω) ≡ cl({w ∈
Co(Ω) : ∃x ∈ X+, xw ≤ xγ,∀γ ∈ Co(Ω)}), where X+ = {x ∈ X and xi > 0,∀i},
and cl(B) is the closure of B. The following Lemma is the basis for developing the
DOMINANCE operator.
Lemma 1. Suppose that Ω = G(sL, aL) ∈ R|SF | is closed and bounded, hence, com-
pacted. For any given aL and sL, the piecewise linear and concave function v¯a
L
(sL, x) =
min{xγ : γ ∈ G(sL, aL)}, x ∈ X, is dual to the set NCo(Ω). Namely, for any xˆ ∈ X,
there exists a γˆ ∈ NCo(Ω) such that v¯aL(sL, xˆ) = xˆγˆ, and conversely, for any γˆ ∈
NCo(Ω), there is a xˆ ∈ X such that v¯aL(sL, xˆ) = xˆγˆ.
Proof. It follows the proof of Lemma 1 in Zhang (2010).
We now determine whether a set G(sL, aL) is pair-wise dominated by a set G(sL, aL
′
)
based on the geometric relationship. Without loss of generality, assume sL is given and
there is x0 such that v¯a
L
t (s
L, x0) ≤ v¯aL′t (sL, x0). Pick any γ ∈ G(sL, aL
′
) and define
the set Φ(γ) ≡ {(λ1, ..., λn) : γ ≥
∑n
i=1 λiw
i, wi ∈ G(sL, aL),∑ni=1 λi = 1, λi ≥ 0}.
Proposition 4 shows that determining the dominance relationship is equivalent to check
whether Φ(γ) is empty for every γ ∈ G(sL, aL′). The pseudocode is summarized in
Algorithm 2.
Proposition 4. G(sL, aL) is dominated by G(sL, aL
′
) if and only if for each γ ∈
G(sL, aL
′
), the set Φ(γ) is non-empty.
Proof. Assume for each γ ∈ G(sL, aL′), Φ(γ) is non-empty. Equivalently, ∀γ ∈ G(sL, aL′),
there is ωγ ∈ Co(G(sL, aL)) such that γ ≥ ωγ . Pick ∀xˆ ∈ X and let γˆ ∈ arg min{xˆγ :
γ ∈ G(sL, aL′)}. Thus, v¯aL′t (sL, xˆ) = xˆγˆ ≥ xˆωγˆ . Lemma 1 guarantees that there
is a ωˆ ∈ NCo(G(sL, aL)) satisfying v¯aLt (sL, xˆ) = xˆωˆ ≤ xˆωγˆ . Thus, v¯a
L
t (s
L, x) ≤
v¯a
L′
t (s
L, x), ∀x ∈ X and the set G(sL, aL) is dominated by the set G(sL, aL′).
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Conversely, let γ∗ ∈ G(sL, aL′) be the γ-vector such that Φ(γ∗) = ∅. Equivalently, γ∗ <
ω,∀ω ∈ NCo(G(sL, aL)). As every γ-vector in G(sL, aL′) is a defining vector for v¯aL′ ,
there is x∗ ∈ X such that v¯aL′ (sL, x∗) = x∗γ∗. Lemma 1 further guarantees that there is
a ω∗ ∈ NCo(G(sL, aL)) satisfying v¯aL(sL, x∗) = x∗ω∗. Thus, v¯aL′ (sL, x∗) < v¯aL(sL, x∗).
Since v¯a
L
t (s
L, x0) ≤ v¯aL′t (sL, x0) by assumption, both functions are continuous, and X is
connected, the two functions intersect over X.
Algorithm 2 Determining the Pairwise Dominance between G(sL, aL) and G(sL, aL
′
).
Initialization:
Randomly generate x0 ∈ X and calculate v¯aL(sL, x0) and v¯aL′ (sL, x0),
where v¯a
L
(sL, x) = min{xγ : γ ∈ G(sL, aL)}. If v¯aL(sL, x0) >
v¯a
L′
(sL, x0), switch G(sL, aL) and G(sL, aL
′
).
Set n = |G(sL, aL)| and PairwiseDominance=TRUE.
for each γ ∈ G(sL, aL′) do
Check the if the set Φ(λ) = ∅ where Φ(λ) =
{
(λ1, ..., λn) : γ ≥
∑n
i=1 λiw
i,
wi ∈ G(sL, aL),∑ni=1 λi = 1, λi ≥ 0}
if Φ(λ) = ∅ then
PairwiseDominance=FALSE; break;
end if
end for
We remark that from geometric perspective, we also can determine the dominance on
primal space X by checking if NCo(G(sL, aL))∩NCo(G(sL, aL′)) 6= ∅ in the dual space,
given sL ∈ SL. See Proposition 5. Conversely, however, if v¯aLt (sL, x) and v¯a
L′
t (s
L, x)
intersect on X, the intersection of NCo(G(sL, aL)) and NCo(G(sL, aL
′
)) could be empty
in the dual space. A counterexample is given Figure 4.
Proposition 5. ∀sL ∈ SL, if NCo(G(sL, aL)) ∩NCo(G(sL, aL′)) 6= ∅, then v¯aLt (sL, x)
and v¯a
L′
t (s
L, x) intersect on X.
Proof. Pick ∀γ∗ ∈ NCo(G(sL, aL))∩NCo(G(sL, aL′)). Let x∗ ∈ X such that v¯aLt (sL, x∗) =
x∗γ∗ per Lemma 1. The definition of NCo and Lemma 1 guarantee v¯aL
′
t (s
L, x∗) ≤ x∗γ∗.
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The result follows by the assumption that v¯a
L′
t (s
L, x0) ≥ v¯aLt (sL, x0).
(a) primal space (b) dual space
Figure 4: The intersection in the (a) primal space does not imply the intersection in the
(b) dual Space
Determining the superset Γc(sL) on the basis of pairwise dominance needs to consider
each pair of action aL, aL
′ ∈ AL, and the pseudocode is summarized in Algorithm
3. For each sL ∈ SL, the program initializes Γc(sL) with the set G(sL, aL,∗), where
aL,∗ ∈ arg maxaL∈AL v¯aLt (sL, x0) and x0 ∈ X is randomly generated. Let Γc(sL, k1) =
{γk′1,k′2 : γk′1,k′2 ∈ Γc(sL), k′1 = k1}, K1(sL) be the number of Γc(sL, k1) sets in Γc(sL), and
K2(s
L, k1) be the number of γ-vectors in Γ
c(sL, k1). The algorithm updates Γ
c(sL),K1(s
L),
and K2(s
L, k1) by the following: For each candidate set G(s
L, aL), the algorithm com-
pares it with the existing sets in Γc(sL). If G(sL, aL) is dominated pair-wisely by an
existing set Γc(sL, k1), then G(s
L, aL) will not be considered; Otherwise, G(sL, aL) will
be included in Γc(sL) and any existing sets Γc(sL, k1) that are dominated by G(s
L, aL)
will be eliminated from Γc(sL). Meanwhile, K1 and K2 are updated accordingly.
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Algorithm 3 Determining the Superset Γc(sL) ⊇ Γ(sL).
for each sL ∈ SL do
Randomly generate x0 ∈ X and calculate v¯aL(sL, x0) = min{x0γ :
γ ∈ G(sL, aL)} for each aL. Select aL,∗ ∈ arg maxaL v¯aL(sL, x0). Let
Γc(sL, 1) = G(sL, aL,∗), K1(sL) = 1, K2(sL, 1) = |G(sL, aL,∗)|.
for each aL ∈ AL, aL 6= aL,∗ do
Randomly generate x′ ∈ X, and calculate:
v¯k1(sL, x′) = min{x′γ : γ ∈ Γc(sL, k1)},∀k1 = 1, ...,K1;
v¯a
L
(sL, x′) = min{x′γ : γ ∈ G(sL, aL)}.
Set IsDominance = FALSE.
for each k1 s.t. v¯
k1(sL, x′) ≥ v¯aL(sL, x′) do
if G(sL, aL) is pair-wise dominated by Γc(sL, k1) then
Set IsDominance = TRUE; break.
end if
end for
if IsDominance = FALSE then
Γc(sL) = Γc(sL) ∪G(sL, aL), K1(sL) = K1 + 1, K2(sL,K1) = |G(sL, aL)|.
for each k1 s.t. v¯
k1(sL, x′) < v¯aL(sL, x′) do
if Γc(sL, k1) is dominated by G(s
L, aL) then
Γc(sL) = Γc(sL) \ Γc(sL, k1), K1 = K1 − 1,delete K2(sL, k1).
end if
end for
end if
end for
end for
Return Γc,K1,K2.
6.2 Determine the Set Γt(s
L)
We now determine the set Γt(s
L) by further removing the dominated sets from Γct(s
L).
Assume sL is given. ∀x ∈ X, let z1(x) be the function value attained by the super-
set Γct(s
L), z1(x) = maxk1 mink2{xγk1,k2 : γk1,k2 ∈ Γct(sL)}, and z2(x) be the value of
function v¯k1 attained by the set Γc(sL, k1), z2(x) = min{xγ : γ ∈ Γc(sL, k1)}. Let the
operator DOMINANCE MIP(Γc(sL, k1),Γ
c
t(s
L)) determine whether the set Γc(sL, k1) is
a dominated set. Then, DOMINANCE MIP(Γc(sL, k1),Γ
c
t(s
L)) can be evaluated via the
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following mixed integer program (1):
u ≡ min z1 − z2
s.t. z2 ≤ xγ, γ ∈ Γct(sL, k1);
− z1 ≤ −xγk1,k2 +M(1− ρk1,k2),
γk1,k2 ∈ Γct(sL);
K2(sL,k1)∑
k2=1
ρk1,k2 = 1,∀k1 = 1, ...,K1(sL); (1)
ρk1,k2 ∈ {0, 1},
x ∈ X, z1, z2 ∈ R,
where M is a large positive number.
The objective function is to find the minimal gap between the two functions, z1(x) and
z2(x). As z2(x) is a piecewise linear and concave function on X, it can be easily de-
termined by the first constraint. The second and the third constraints define z1. For
the purpose of explanation, ∀k1 ∈ K1(sL), we further introduce a variable ηk1 as the
minimum value attained by set Γct(s
L, k1), i.e., η
k1(x) = min{xγ : γ ∈ Γct(sL, k1)}. Then,
(i) ηk1 ≥ xγk1,k2 −M(1 − ρk1,k2) and the multiple-choice constraint on ρk1,k2s ensure
that there is exactly one γ ∈ Γct(sL, k1) selected to define ηk1 ; (ii) z1 ≥ ηk1 ,∀k1, by the
definition of z1. Hence, the combination of (i) and (ii) leads to the second constraint
and variables ηk1s can be omitted. The last equation ensures that the belief states are
in a nonnegative simplex.
Clearly, if the objective value u > 0, then Γct(s
L, k1) is not a supporting set for v¯t and
should be eliminated. We need to solve K1 number of MIPs to finalize Γt(s
L). The
pseudocode for determining Γt(s
L) from its superset Γct(s
L) is presented in Algorithm 4.
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Algorithm 4 Determining Γt(s
L) from its Superset Γct(s
L).
for each sL ∈ SL do
Set Γt(s
L) = Γct(s
L).
for each k1 ∈ K1(sL) do
determine
u =DOMINANCE MIP(Γct(s
L, k1),Γt(s
L))).
if u > 0 then
Γt(s
L) = Γt(s
L) \ Γct(sL, k1).
end if
end for
end for
Return Γt.
7 Piecewise Linear Concave Approximation
Given a set of γ-vectors Γt, the value function v¯t(s
L, x) = maxk1 mink2{xγk1,k2 : γk1,k2 ∈
Γt(s
L)} is piecewise linear but not concave. The iterative algorithm we developed re-
quires a piecewise linear and concave function for the next iteration. We thus approxi-
mate v¯t by a function v˜t satisfying the following conditions:
(i) ∀sL ∈ SL, v˜t(sL, x) is a piecewise linear and concave on X;
(ii) v˜t(s
L, x) ≤ v¯t(sL, x), ∀sL ∈ SL, x ∈ X;
(iii) the distance between v˜t and v¯t is as small as possible, where we define the distance
between two bounded functions v1, v2 ∈ V as
d(v1, v2)(sL) = max
x∈X
|v1(sL, x)− v2(sL, x)|.
Equivalently, for each sL, we want to determine a set Γ˜t(s
L) such that v˜t(s
L, x) =
min{xγ : γ ∈ Γ˜(sL)} satisfies conditions (ii) and (iii). For computational efficiency, we
consider the case where Γ˜t(s
L) ⊂ Γt(sL) in this paper. We do acknowledge that v˜t(sL, x)
may be further improved by constructing γ /∈ Γt(sL) for some instances. Determining
a general procedure for finding the best piecewise linear and concave approximation
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of an arbitrary piecewise linear function is an interesting research topic for the future.
Furthermore, an advantage of selecting Γ˜t(s
L) ⊂ Γt(sL) is that each γ ∈ Γ˜t(sL) is still
associated with an action pair a = (aL, aF ). Thus, it is easy to explain and implement
the policy associated with the lower bound v˜t(s
L, x).
We remark that the maximal gap between two functions v1, v2 ∈ V for a given sL ∈ SL
must occur at (i) where two segments of v1 (or v2) intersect, or (ii) extreme points of X.
Thus, ∀sL ∈ SL, we could determine the set Γ˜t(sL) satisfying conditions (ii) and (iii)
by a finite set of belief points W ⊂ X. Given sL ∈ SL, the pseudocode of determining
Γ˜t(s
L) is outlined in Algorithm 5.
Algorithm 5 Approximating v¯t(s
L, x) by v˜t(s
L, x)
Step 1: Initialize W0 by including the
following two groups:
Extreme points : extreme points of X are ei, i ∈ SF, whose ith entry
is 1; 0 elsewhere. Evaluate v¯t(s
L, ei) = maxk1 mink2{eiγk1,k2 : γk1,k2 ∈
Γt(s
L)}.
Witness points: the PURGE operation has identified at least
a witness point wi for each γ ∈ Γt(sL). Evaluate v¯t(sL, wi) =
maxk1 mink2{wiγk1,k2 : γk1,k2 ∈ Γt(sL)}.
Let N = |W0|.
Step 2: Construct the concave approximation set Γ˜n(s
L) by the
concave approximation MIP (2) on the set Wn.
Step 3: Check if the condition (ii) is satisfied on X by the
verification MIP (3). If the condition (ii) is violated, the
verification MIP will return an x∗ ∈ X with v˜t(sL, x∗) > v¯t(sL, x∗).
Add x∗ to the set Wn.
Step 4: Evaluate the maximal gap between v˜t(s
L, x) and v¯t(s
L, x) by an
error bound MIP (4). If the maximal gap (sL) is positive at point
x′ ∈ X, Wn+1 = Wn ∪ {x′} and update N = |Wn+1|.
Step 5: Go to Step 2 and update the concave approximation set
Γ˜n+1(s
L) on the set Wn+1. The program stops if Wn+1 = Wn. The
difference between v˜t(s
L, x) and v¯t(s
L, x) is bounded by (sL).
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We initialize the set W0 in Step 1, by including the extreme points of the belief space
X and at least a witness point for each γ-vector in Γt(s
L). These witness points are
generated by the PURGE operation discussed in Section 5. We develop a concave ap-
proximation MIP in Step 2 to construct an initial set Γ˜t(s
L) based on Wn. As the
condition (ii) is only enforced on the set Wn in Step 2, Step 3 further determines if the
condition (ii) is violated on X. If there is an x∗ ∈ X at which v˜t(sL, x∗) > v¯t(sL, x∗),
we update Wn by including x
∗. Step 4 determines (sL), the maximal distance between
the v˜t(s
L, x) and v¯t(s
L, x). To improve the approximation quality and reduce the gap
between v¯t and v˜t, we also add the belief point at which the maximal distance is at-
tained to the new set Wn+1. The program continues to update Γ˜t(s
L) based on Wn+1.
The entire procedure stops when no further improvement is identified. When it stops,
the condition (ii) is guaranteed on X and the maximal distance between v¯(sL) and its
approximate value v˜(sL) is bounded above by (sL). We now detail each step in the
following subsections.
7.1 Concave Approximation on W
Assume sL ∈ SL is given. Let W = {xi} be a set of belief points in X, N = |W |, z˜i be
the maximum function values attained at xi by the set Γ˜t(s
L), and zi be the function
values attained at xi by the set Γt(s
L), i.e., z˜i = v˜t(s
L, xi) = min{xiγ : γ ∈ Γ˜t(sL)}, and
zi = v¯t(s
L, xi) = maxk1 mink2{xiγk1,k2 : γk1,k2 ∈ Γt(sL)}.
For each γk1,k2 ∈ Γt(sL), define a binary variable yk1,k2 = 1 if γk1,k2 ∈ Γ˜t(sL) and
yk1,k2 = 0 if γk1,k2 /∈ Γ˜t(sL). Thus, Γ˜t(sL) = {γk1,k2 : γk1,k2 ∈ Γt(sL), yk1,k2 = 1}. Let g
be the distance between v¯t(s
L, x) and v˜t(s
L, x) on the set W , that is, g = maxi z
i − z˜i.
With the aid of additional binary variables for evaluating z˜i, we seek the set Γ˜t(s
L) by
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the following mixed integer program (2):
min Ng −
∑
i
z˜i
s.t. z˜i ≤ xiγk1,k2 +M(1− yk1,k2), γk1,k2 ∈ Γt(sL), ∀i;
− z˜i ≤ −xiγk1,k2 +M(1− ηk1,k2i ),∀i, k1, k2;∑
k1
∑
k2
ηk1,k2i = 1,∀i;
ηk1,k2i ≤ yk1,k2 , ∀i, k1, k2; (2)
1 ≤
|K1|∑
k1=1
|K2|∑
k2=1
yk1,k2 ≤ |Γ| − 1;
z˜i ≤ zi,∀i;
g ≥ zi − z˜i,∀i;
yk1,k2 , ηk1,k2i ∈ {0, 1}, z˜i, g ∈ R,
where M is a large positive number.
Minimizing the distance between v¯t and v˜t (on W ) is equivalent to minimize the maximal
gap g. The expression −∑i∈I z˜i is added to the objective function in order to close the
gap on W . The multiplier N on g is to ensure that the two quantities are within the
same magnitude. The first to the fourth constraints compute z˜i,∀i. Specifically, the first
constraint ensures that z˜i is bounded above by the approximation function constructed
by Γ˜t(s
L). Each binary variable ηk1,k2i is associated with a γ-vector in Γt(s
L) and a belief
point xi. The second and the third constraints are necessary to guarantee that ∀xi ∈ X,
there exists one and only one defining vector γk1,k2 ∈ Γ˜t(sL) such that z˜i = xiγk1,k2 . The
fourth constraint implies that if γk1,k2 satisfies z˜i = xiγk1,k2 , then γk1,k2 ∈ Γ˜t(sL). The
fifth constraint is based on the observation that mink1 mink2{xγk1,k2 : γk1,k2 ∈ Γt(sL)} ≤
mink2{xγk1,k2 : γk1,k2 ∈ Γt(sL)},∀k1, hence, Γ˜t(sL) ( Γt(sL). The second to the last
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constraint guarantees that v˜t(s
L, x) ≤ v¯t(sL, x) on W and the last constraint determines
the maximal gap between v˜t(s
L, x) and v¯t(s
L, x) on W .
We can enhance the performance of the MIP (2) by providing a good feasible solution
exploiting the structure results of v¯t. Note that for any given k1, v¯
k1
t computed by the
set Γt(s
L, k1) is a lower bound to v¯t(s
L, x) and satisfies all three conditions. Pick any
w ∈ W . Let zk1w = min{wγ : γ ∈ Γt(sL, k1)} and k′1 ∈ arg maxk1 zk1w . Then Γt(sL, k′1) is
a feasible solution to the MIP (2). Determining such initial solutions is straightforward
and computationally inexpensive.
7.2 Verification on X
The concave approximation MIP (2) only ensures that the condition (ii) is satisfied on
W ( X. The following mixed integer program (3) further checks whether the condition
is satisfied on X:
µ∗ ≡ min z1 − z2
s.t. z2 ≤ xγ, γ ∈ Γ˜t(sL);
− z1 ≤ −xγk1,k2 +M(1− ρk1,k2),
γk1,k2 ∈ Γt(sL);
K2(sL,k1)∑
k2=1
ρk1,k2 = 1,∀k1; (3)
ρk1,k2 ∈ {0, 1}, z1, z2 ∈ R, x ∈ X,
where M is a large positive number.
The objective function is to minimize the difference between the two functions for a
given sL ∈ SL: z1(x) = maxk1 mink2{xγk1,k2 : γk1,k2 ∈ Γt(sL)} and its approximation
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z2(x) = min{xγ : γ ∈ Γ˜t(sL)}. Thus, MIP (3) is the same as MIP (1) where: (i) the value
z2 is determined by the first constraint, and (ii) the second and the third constraints
and the binary variable ρk1,k2 associated with each vector γk1,k2 ∈ Γt(sL) determine z1.
If µ∗ < 0 at the belief state x∗ ∈ X, then x∗ should be added to W , and both of the
MIPs (2) and (3) should be resolved. The process should continue until µ∗ ≥ 0.
7.3 Approximation Error
We now determine (sL), the maximal difference between z1(x) based on Γt(s
L) and its
approximation z2(x) based on Γ˜t(s
L), by the following MIP (4):
(sL) ≡ max z1 − z2
s.t. z1 ≤ xγk1,k2 +M(1− yk1), ∀k1, k2;
K1∑
k1=1
yk1 = 1;
− z2 ≤ −xγk +M(1− ρk), γk ∈ Γ˜t(sL); (4)∑
k
ρk = 1;
yk1 , ρk ∈ {0, 1}, z1, z2 ∈ R, x ∈ X,
where M is a large positive number.
The objective function is to find the maximal gap between z1(x) and z2(x). The first two
constraints compute z1(x) on the basis of Γt(s
L). As z1(x) = maxk1 v
k1(sL, x) for a given
sL, the binary variable yk1 for each k1 and the multiple-choice constraint on y
k1 ensure
that there is exactly one k1 selected to compute z1. Meanwhile, z1(x) ≤ xγk1,k2 ,∀k2
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for the selected k1. Similarly, the third and the fourth constraints compute z2(x). The
binary variable ρk associated with each γ-vector in Γ˜(sL) and its multiple-choice con-
straint guarantee that there exists one and only one γ ∈ Γ˜(sL) defining z2(x).
The approximation error is bounded above by the objective value (sL) ≥ 0, assuming
at point x∗ ∈ X. To improve the approximation quality, we also include x∗ to up-
date W and Γ˜(sL). Note, the value function associated with the second best leader’s
action v¯2
ndbest(sL, x) is a feasible solution to the MIP (2) and it is a second best min-
imizer of minv¯k1
∑
i∈W [v¯(s
L, wi) − v¯k1(sL, wi)]. Thus, this procedure guarantees that
(sL) ≤ maxk1 |v¯k1(sL, x∗) − v¯2
ndbest(sL, x∗)|. That is, the approximation function at
any belief point is no worse than the performance induced by the leader’s second best
action. Moreover, the following Corollary shows the approximation error of the proposed
approach could be zero when there is a dominant action of the leader.
Corollary 1. Assume there is a leader’s action aL,∗ such that G(sL, aL,∗) pairwisely
dominates G(sL, aL),∀aL ∈ AL, aL 6= aL,∗. Then (sL) = 0.
Proof. Clearly, the set G(sL, aL,∗) satisfies the conditions (i)-(iii) and the pairwise dom-
inance assumption implies Γ˜t(s
L) = Γt(s
L) = G(sL, aL,∗).
8 Error Bound and Convergence Analysis for T =∞
As has been stated earlier, the optimal value function satisfies vn = Hvn−1 and there is
a fixed point v∗ ∈ V where v∗ = limn→∞ vn. While directly determining vn on the basis
of vn−1 can be challenging, we have developed an iterative procedure for determining
a lower bound of vn. Let T : V → V be the (nonlinear) operator such that ∀u ∈ V ,
Tu is the approximation of u satisfying the conditions (i)-(iii). Let v˜0 = Tv0. At each
iteration, Algorithm 1 evaluates v¯n = Hv˜n−1 and approximates v¯n by v˜n = T v¯n. We
now show in Theorem 2 that the constructed sequence {v¯n} also converges in V . Thus,
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the proposed approach can also be used to solve, at least approximately, the infinite
planning horizon. Denote v¯∗ = limn→∞ v¯n, clearly v¯∗ ≤ v∗.
Theorem 2. vn ≥ v¯n ≥ v˜n and the sequence {v¯n} converges.
Proof. vn ≥ v¯n ≥ v˜n is obvious by the definition of T and the fact that if u ≤ v, u, v ∈ V ,
then Hu ≤ Hv. The convergence of {v¯n} follows from the fact that (H ◦ T ) is a
contraction operator on V . To see it, we first show that ||Tu− Tv|| ≤ ||u− v||. Assume
||u− v|| = . Then u−  ≤ v ≤ u+ . By the definition of T , Tu−  ≤ Tv ≤ v ≤ u+ .
Similarly, we also have Tv −  ≤ Tu ≤ u ≤ v + . Note v¯n = Hv˜n−1 = (H ◦ T )v¯n−1.
Thus, ||(H ◦ T )u− (H ◦ T )v|| ≤ β||Tu− Tv|| ≤ β||u− v||.
Note that ∀sL ∈ SL, v¯n(sL, x) − v˜n(sL, x) ≤ n(sL),∀x ∈ X. Let ∗n = maxsL∈S n(sL).
The following result further determines the error between vn and v¯n.
Proposition 6. ||vn − v¯n|| ≤
∑n−1
k=0 β
n−k∗k.
Proof. ||v1 − v¯1|| = ||Hv0 −Hv˜0|| ≤ β∗0. Thus, by induction
||vn − v¯n|| = ||Hvn−1 −Hv˜n−1|| ≤ β||vn−1 − v˜n−1||
= β||vn−1 − v¯n−1 + v¯n−1 − v˜n−1||
≤ β||vn−1 − v¯n−1||+ β||v¯n−1 − v˜n−1||
≤
n−2∑
k=0
βn−k∗k + β
∗
n−1 =
n−1∑
k=0
βn−k∗k.
Clearly, {∗n} is bounded. Let ∗ = supn≥0 ∗n. Then, ||v∗ − v¯∗|| = limn→∞ ||vn − v¯n|| ≤
∗β
1−β .
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9 An Illustrative Example
In this section, we consider the liquid egg production problem presented in Zhang (2013)
to illustrate the potential application of the proposed approach.
9.1 Problem Description
Liquid egg products are widely used by the food service industry and as ingredients in
other food products such as mayonnaise and ice cream (USDA 2015). A deliberate con-
tamination in the liquid egg products by an adversary will breach food safety, leading
to excessive morbidity and mortality.
Figure 5 is an overview of a liquid egg production process. The critical components of
the process identified by Zhang (2013) in Figure 6 include collecting vats, raw material
tanks, pasteurization, and finished product tanks. An unknown adversary may use this
system as a toxin delivery vehicle by inserting a toxin (e.g., botulinum) at these com-
ponents (“targets”). The consequence of such attacks occurred at each component is
defined as the number of contaminated packages. The numerical values of the conse-
quence have been analyzed in literature.
We now illustrate how to use the developed method to support the production manager
in selecting a sequence of actions to protect against an unknown adversary, in order
to maximize the long-run productivity of the liquid egg production facility. We allow
for multiple attacks and each attack can be successful or unsuccessful. An unsuccessful
attack occurs when the adversary launches an attack but fails to insert any toxin to the
system (e.g., the adversary is caught by the manager during the attack). Thus, the pro-
duction process will not be affected, and the manager needs to prepare for next possible
attacks. After a successful attack, however, the manager has to stop the production
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process to remove inserted toxin and clean up the system. Thus, the game stops when-
ever a successful attack occurs. As the pasteurization process can significantly reduce
the effectiveness of the botulinum toxin, we assume the manager needs to protect three
targets: Collecting Vat (Target 1), Raw Production Tank (Target 2), and the Finished
Product Tank (Target 3).
Figure 5: The liquid egg production system studied in Zhang (2013)
Figure 6: Critical components of the liquid egg product process (Zhang 2013)
State spaces, action spaces, and system dynamics: We assume the manager can only
protect one target each time. Thus, the state of the manager is the target under protec-
tion. The state space of the manager is SL = {Target 1 Protected,Target 2 Protected,
Target 3 Protected,Attacked}, where the “Attacked” state indicates toxin has been suc-
cessfully inserted to the system. The manager decides which target to protect dynami-
cally based on its (possibly inaccurate) observation of the adversary.
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The state of the adversary is the location of the adversary. Hence, SF= {Target 1,
Target 2, Target 3, Attacked}, and |S| = |SF ||SL| = 16. At Target i, the adversary can
either attack the target or switch to another target. Thus, there are 3 actions for each
agent (9 action pairs) in each state.
The system transits to a new state once both the agents have determined their actions.
Observation space: The manager’s observations of the adversary are the possible loca-
tions of the adversary. Thus, ZL = SF , |ZL| = 4. We assume that the manager has
the ability to detect an attack (e.g., by testing) if the attack has successfully occurred.
Specifically, the observation matrix is P (zL|sF ) = sF ,zL , where 0 ≤ sF ,zL ≤ 1 and∑
zL∈ZL sF ,zL = 1.
Reward structure, criterion, and objective: The system can produce L number of qual-
ified packages under normal operations. A successful attack with 2000 grams of bo-
tulinum at location i can result in Lic number of contaminated packages, i ∈ {Target
1, Target 2, Target 3}. The numerical values of L,Lic are estimated by the simula-
tion model developed in Zhang (2013). If there is no attack, the reward of the manger
r(s, a), sL 6= “Attacked” is its normal productivity L. If a successful attack has been
detected, no package will be produced as the production stops and the manager has to
clean up the system. We assume the manager will receive additional bonus b > 0 for
successfully preventing an attack. Let p (q) be the probability of having a successful
attack at a protected (unprotected) target. Assume 0 ≤ p << q ≤ 1. The cleanup cost
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is C for the manager to remove toxin from the system after a successful attack. Thus,
r(s, a) =

L sL 6= “Attacked”, aF 6= “attack”;
L− p ∗ Lic + (1− p)b aL = “protect target i”, aF = “attack target i”,
sF = i, sL 6= “Attacked”;
L− q ∗ Lic + (1− q)b aL 6= “protect target i”, aF = “attack target i”,
sF = i, sL 6= “Attacked”;
C sL 6= “Attacked”, sF = “Attacked Target i”;
0 sL = “Attacked”.
The criterion of the manager is the expected finite horizon total discounted reward
v(ζ0) = E{
∑T
t=0 β
tr(st, at)|ζ0}, where we assume β = 0.85 and T = 30 for illustrative
purpose. The objective of the manager is to maximize the value of criterion under the
worst-case scenario.
9.2 Numerical Results
We first use t = T to illustrate the procedure in Algorithm 1. Table 1 summarizes
the γ-vectors after the PURGE and DOMINANCE operations for sL 6=“Attacked” at
t = T . Thus, vT (s
L, x) = maxk1 mink2{xγk1,k2 : γ ∈ ΓT (sL)}. Figure 7 shows the graph
of the true value function vT and its approximation v˜T projected on the non-absorbing
states of the follower (i.e., sF 6=“Attacked”). Clearly, vT (sL, x) (in blue) is not a concave
function and v˜T (s
L, x) (in red) is indeed the best piecewise linear concave approximation
function of vT (s
L, x). Let P ⊂ X be the region where the approximation is accurate,
i.e., P = {x ∈ X : vT (sL, x) = v˜T (sL, x)}. Then |P |/|X| = 78.63% (in terms of the
Lebesgue measure), and the maximal approximation error (4.36%) occurs around the
extreme point e2.
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γ1,1 γ1,2 γ2,1 γ2,2 γ3,1
916 906 0 756 0
723 906 916 756 703
746 906 786 756 726
-100 -100 -100 -100 -100
Table 1: ΓT (s
L), sL 6=“Attacked”
Figure 7: The true value function vT and its concave approximation v˜T
Figure 8 shows the convergence properties of the overall procedure. The maximum
deviation of the value function v¯t+1 from v¯t
dev = max
sL∈SL
max
x∈X
|v¯t+1(sL, x)− v¯t(sL, x)|
declines as the algorithm proceeds, and the value function v¯ converges to v¯∗ after 27
iterations, where v¯∗ (projected on the non-absorbing states of the follower) is plotted in
Figure 9.
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Figure 8: Convergence result
Figure 9: The (projected) value function v¯∗
The entire solution procedure was performed on an Intel 3.10 GHz processor having
6.00 GB memory. The total computation time for T = 30 was 156.31 seconds, where
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the PURGE, DOMINANCE, and APPROXIMATION operations accounted for 4.78%,
11.86%, and 83.45%, respectively. As at least a witness point was associated with each
γ-vector in the concave approximation MIP (2), the sizes of MIPs in the APPROXI-
MATION step are significantly larger than those of the MIPs in the PURGE step and
DOMINANCE step (could be 10∼20 times larger).
In order to validate the solution procedure and computational results, we perform a
numerical comparison among three policies by simulation. The first policy is the policy
constructed according to Algorithm 1; the second policy assumes that the leader ran-
domly selects its action whereas the follower selects the action minimizing the leader’s
value of criterion; the third policy determines the leader’s action by the proposed al-
gorithm whereas the follower’s action is randomly selected. For ∀x0 ∈ X, sL ∈ SL, we
simulate the sample paths under the three policies. The performance measure of a policy
δ is defined as the total discounted reward of the sample path generated by policy δ.
Figure 10 details the distribution of the performance measure for each policy based
on 1000 simulations. The box plots show that the proposed approach indeed provides
a baseline performance for the leader when the follower’s actions are uncertain. Any
deviation in the follower’s policy (e.g., irrational behavior) will result in an improved
leader’s performance. As the goal of the proposed algorithm is to provide a lower bound
estimate for the leader’s performance, the proposed policy is not necessarily better than
the second policy for any belief point x0 ∈ X for each sample path. However, the
proposed policy still significantly outperforms the second policy on average.
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Figure 10: Comparisons among the proposed policy and two randomized policies
10 Conclusions
In this paper, we performed the worst-case analysis for a partially observable stochastic
game with two non-cooperative agents, a leader and a follower. This research provided
a modelling framework and a solution procedure for analyzing the baseline performance
for a leader concerned with a worst-case scenario affected by another agent’s actions,
where the state of the system cannot be precisely observed by each agent, and where
the reward structure and the rationality of the follower are unknown. We analyzed the
structural properties of the optimal value function of the leader vt and showed that
this problem formulation cannot be transformed into a standard POMDP. Thus, we
proposed a solution procedure to determine a lower bound of vt in the finite horizon.
We further analyzed the quality of the lower bound and showed that the proposed
procedure converges in the infinite horizon. The solution procedure was illustrated by a
liquid egg production example in a security context.
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The lower bound was constructed by the sets Γ˜t(s
L) ⊂ Γt(sL), ∀sL ∈ SL. Future re-
search should further improve the lower bound by efficiently searching γ /∈ Γt(sL). It
is also interesting to explore the feasibility of extending the existing exact and approx-
imation algorithms for POMDPs to the proposed problem. The developed worst-case
analysis provided a benchmark result for a multi-agent partially observable stochas-
tic environment. Thus, the follow-up research may include investigating the value of
improved understanding of the adversarial behaviors in non-cooperative partially ob-
servable stochastic games by comparing with the benchmark results.
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